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Secondary school enrollment rates in the developing countries are usually lower for girls than 
boys, especially in rural areas.  In the mid 1990’s a female school stipend program was introduced to 
subsidize girls’ secondary education in rural Bangladesh.  Although all of rural Bangladesh was eventually 
covered by this program, it was not introduced at the same time in all areas and to all class cohorts. This 
variation in timing is the source of parameter identification in the analysis.  Using two different datasets 
and school/village-level fixed effects, we estimate the effects of this stipend program on school 
enrollments.  The analysis based upon two cross-sectional household surveys covering a common set of 
villages finds that the female stipend program increased girls’ secondary education substantially, but had no 
discernable effect on the schooling of boys.  The analysis performed with an annual panel of school-level 
data also finds a significant effect of the stipend program on girl’s enrollment and reduced the enrollment 
of boys in coeducational secondary schools.   
 
 
The paper benefited from comments and suggestions of participants of seminars at the World Bank in 
Washington and at the National Academy for Educational Management (NAEM) in Dhaka.  In particular, 
we would like to thank Harold Alderman, Gershon Feder, Barbara Herz, Elizabeth King, Emmanuel 
Jimenez, Lutfur Rahman, and Martin Ravallion for useful comments.  Views expressed in this paper are 
entirely those of the authors and do not reflect any way those of the World Bank or its affiliated 
organizations, or the organizations where the other authors belong.   1
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Gender disparity in adult literacy, school enrollment and attainment is severe in Africa, 
the Middle East, and South Asia.  Although this disparity in schooling exists for all ages, 
it is more pronounced at the secondary school than at the primary level (Herz and others 
1991).  The situation in Bangladesh is not atypical.  The country's literacy rate was only 
22 percent for females in 1989, compared to 47 percent for males  (World Bank 1992a).
1   
In 1991 only 5 percent of rural girls completed the 10
th grade compared to 12 percent of 
boys (Khandker and Samad 1995).  
 
Gender disparities in schooling persist in many societies despite the fact that 
economic returns to education may be higher for women than for men in many low 
income countries (King and Hill 1993; Schultz 1987).  In addition, higher women’s 
education has been shown to be strongly related to reduced fertility and greater human 
capital investment in children, and these effects are more pronounced for secondary than 
for primary education of women.  Girls’ schooling may suffer from the higher costs of 
educating girls than boys in many developing countries (Herz and others 1991; Mannan 
1988).  Cultural practices dictate that parents may pay more for clothing and 
transportation for girls than for boys. There is evidence that gender disparity is an inferior 
good, becoming less pronounced as income rises (Herz and others 1991; King and Hill 
1993; Schultz 1987).
2  Nonetheless it would take many years for income growth to 
greatly reduce gender disparity in most of the developing world.  An important question 
is whether there are government interventions that might more quickly reduce this gender 
disparity.   
 
Governments in some developing countries have intervened in various ways to 
promote the schooling of girls.
3 One such intervention that has been implemented is a 
subsidy for girl’s school attendance.  In Pakistan, a female fellowship program at the 
                                                 
1 Things have improved somewhat since then. In 1998, the adult literacy rate was 29 percent among 
females and 51 percent among males (World Bank 2000) 
2 While economic growth reduces gender disparity, Dollar and Gatti (1999) find that female education, 
especially at the secondary level, promotes economic growth. 
3  A detailed discussion of these measures appears in Herz and others (1991).   2
primary school level was found to increase the school enrollment of both girls and boys 
(Kim, Alderman, and Orazem 1999). In Colombia, school voucher programs targeted to 
girls are found to increase enrollment rates of both girls and boys (King, Orazem, and 
Wohlgemuth 1999).  The World Bank has argued that programs targeted at girls can 
increase both girls' and boys’ schooling (World Bank 2000).  There is, however, no clear 
evidence as yet on the effect of school subsidies for girls on the schooling of boys.
4   
 
In early nineties, the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) sought to increase rural 
female enrollment at the secondary school level by launching a female secondary stipend 
program. Four separate projects, covering different thanas (districts), were begun with 
donor support: Female Secondary School Assistance Project (FSSAP) funded by IDA 
(118 thanas), Female Secondary Stipend Project (FSSP) funded by GOB (282 thanas), 
Secondary Education Development Project (SEDP) funded by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) (53 thanas), and Female Secondary Education Project (FSEP) funded by 
NORAD (7 thanas). These projects introduced a similar nationwide stipend program 
targeted to girls in grades 6 through 10 in 460 rural thanas (districts) starting in 1994
5.   
 
The stated objectives of this program are to: (i) increase school enrollment 
among secondary-aged girls; (ii) improve the secondary schooling completion rate for 
girls; and (iii) increase female age at marriage.  The program introduced a uniform 
stipend and tuition subsidy program for each girl attending a secondary school in rural 
areas who satisfy the following eligibility criteria: (i) attend 75 percent of school days;  
(ii) attain some level of measured academic proficiency (45 percent of class-level test 
scores); and (iii) remain unmarried.  Once a school participates in the program, all female 
students satisfying these criteria receive a specified amount of stipend and other 
allowances as prescribed for each grade.  The girl’s school is directly paid all of her 
tuition by the project.  The amounts of stipend and other allowances paid to eligible 
female students are specified in Table 1.  The stipend was expected to cover as much as 
                                                 
4 The Food for Education (FFE) program subsidizes the primary school education of both boys and girls in 
Bangladesh and has been found to increase the schooling of both (Ravallion and Wodon 2000).    
5 In fact, the origin of the stipend program dates back to 1982 when a local NGO started a pilot project in a 
single thana.     3
50 percent of the costs of textbooks, uniforms, stationary, transportation, exam fees, and 
miscellaneous direct educational expenses. The stipend is paid directly to an account in 
the girl’s name in the nearest Agrani Bank, a state agricultural bank with branches all 
over rural Bangladesh.   
 
In addition, these stipend programs also have been complemented with other 
components such as curriculum reforms and instructional materials development, teacher 
training, recruitment of female teachers, improvement of school infrastructure, awareness 
programs at the community level, and institutional capacity building.  These additional 
project components, however, differ across thanas depending on the agency funding the 
stipend program (i. e., Asian Development Bank, World Bank, NORAD and GOB).   
 
The combined stipend and tuition subsidy for each girl is Tk. 906 for non-
government schools and Tk. 847 for government schools.  The stipend itself accounts for 
two-thirds of the total outlay used to support the program.  The female subsidy is about 6 
percent of Bangladesh’s per capita income.  Supporting over 2 million girls each year 
under this program has evolved into a major expenditure obligation for the government.  
The stipend budget alone accounts for more than 60 percent of the country's secondary 
school development budget and 13 percent of the education sector budget (World Bank 
1997). 
 
Various reports, including the World Bank’s mid-term review, suggest the 
success of this program in reducing gender disparity in secondary education.   There has 
been a marked increase in the secondary school enrollment among girls in recent years.  
Aggregate statistics suggest that girls’ school enrollment has increased at a rate of 13 
percent per year since 1994, while the rate of increase of boys has only been 2.5 percent 
per year.
6  Household surveys over a period of seven years (between 1991 and 1998) also 
indicate remarkable gains for girls.
7  To date, there has been no systematic study 
measuring how much of this increase in girls' secondary school enrollments is due to the 
                                                 
6 In addition, there has been a marked decline in the proportion of girls marrying at early age. 
7 The average performance of girls exceeded that of boys in the national post-secondary school level 
examination (Secondary School Certificate) of 1998.   4
stipend program. The Government of Bangladesh and donors are favorably disposed to 
extend the program, and there is mounting public pressure to extend the program to cover 
both boys and schools in urban areas.  As resources are limited, targeting by other 
attributes besides gender may be worth considering, but without an impact assessment, it 




This paper estimates the impact of the female secondary stipend program on 
girls and boys using both school and household survey data.  A key feature of the 
program that we rely on to identify its effects on school enrollment is the varying times at 
which it was instituted across the thanas (districts) of Bangladesh.  Recognizing that the 
timing of the program’s placement across Bangladesh may be endogenous, perhaps based 
on the outcome of the perceived educational needs or demand’s of communities, we 
make use of community fixed-effects methods to sweep out unobserved community-level 
heterogeneity.  Our results suggest that, after controlling for time trend, and school and 
village-level observed and unobserved characteristics, the female stipend program has 
increased girls’ secondary education substantially, and had no significant effects on boys’ 
schooling.   Parameter identification rests on the limited variation in program duration 
across the villages in our household sample.  Our results are strengthened our 
confirmatory results from an analysis based on a very different school-level data set.  
Although these data have there own limitations, taken together our results strongly 
suggest that the stipend program increased girl’s secondary school enrollment and 
provides mixed evidence of their effects on that of boys. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section two describes the program's 
achievements in terms of aggregate secondary school statistics and MIS data from the 
World Bank funded FSSAP project.  Section three describes the household data used for 
the analysis.  Section four discusses the econometric model to be used to estimate the 
program effect with household-level data collected jointly by the Bangladesh Institute of 
                                                 
8 The World Bank has already approved an IDA loan of $120 million to continue the FSSAP project in 
March 2002.     5
Development Studies (BIDS) and the World Bank.    Section five discusses the estimated 
program effects based on household survey data.  Section six presents the impact 
estimates based on the MIS data from the FSSAP project.   Section seven discusses the 
issues of targeting.  And finally, the concluding section summarizes the results with 
policy implications.     
 
2.    Bangladesh's achievements in female secondary education   
Two data sources are used to examine Bangladesh's recent achievements in female 
secondary education after the introduction of the female stipend program.  The first is the 
Management  Information System (MIS) of the World Bank funded  Female Secondary 
School Assistance Project (FSSAP),  which provides enrollment data for FSSAP schools 
by grade and sex since the stipend program was introduced in 1994.   The second source 
is the published government statistics on nationwide school enrollment collected by the 
Ministry of Education. 
 
All the secondary schools participating in any of the female secondary stipend 
programs are required to regularly provide the project offices with school and recipient 
information using a uniform MIS format.  This required information includes student 
enrollment by gender and by class, information on school facilities (e.g., class room size, 
availability of tube wells, latrines, etc.), attendance and examination record of the stipend 
recipients, and other school information needed for administering the stipend program.  
The FSSAP-MIS information on enrollment and other school characteristics is relatively 
well organized.  While all the other stipend program offices maintain essentially the same 
set of information under the same MIS format, the MIS data from other project offices 
were either not available, in some case because it had not yet been computerized, or was 
not well enough organized to be accessible.
9   Consequently, our analysis makes use only 
of the FSSAP data available from 118 thanas (out of 460) in rural Bangladesh.  
Furthermore, since male-only schools are not eligible for the program, the FSSAP-MIS 
data include only female-only schools and coeducational schools.  These data thus reveal 
                                                 
9 We requested that the project directors of the FSSP and SEDP programs  provide similar MIS data.  
Despite repeated requests, we failed to obtain such data.  We would like to thank  Dr. Lutfur Rahman, the 
project director and his colleagues at FSSAP for releasing the MIS data for this study to us.     6
the pattern of enrollments over time in schools in which girl’s receiving FSSAP tuition 
and stipend support can enroll, and not the overall pattern of enrollments.  These FSSAP 
school enrollment increase are probably only slightly inflated in the initial years by the 
transfer of girls from non-FSSAP schools to FSSAP schools.  By 1998, 98 percent of all 
rural secondary schools that enroll girls were part of this program.  Aggregate data on 
girl’s school enrollment (shown in Table 3) also demonstrate very large rates of increase 
during this period. 
 
Even with their deficiencies, aggregate FSSAP-MIS data reveal changes in the 
pattern of enrollments that are consistent with the program altering behavior.  Table 2 
provides class-wise total enrollment each year from 1994 through 1998, by gender, in 
schools that appear in the MIS database continuously since 1994.
10  Looking across the 
rows of the table, which are restated as index numbers in the bottom panel, demonstrates 
a marked pattern of increased enrollments in higher classes.  For example, at the onset of 
the program in 1994, the tenth grade had only 36.0 percent of the female students as the 
sixth grade.  In 1998, this proportion had increased to 59.2 percent.  Figure 1 graphs these 
relative class size index numbers by year.  Although there is some variations over the 
years, all of the class distributions after 1994 lie entirely above the 1994 distribution.  No 
such pattern exists for male schooling in the same schools – examination of Table 2 
reveals that there is no discernible pattern to male relative class enrollments from 1994 
through 1998.  Figure 2 demonstrates that the timing of increases in class sizes for girls 
coincided with the introduction of the FSSAP program.  Class 7 saw a large jump in 1995, 




                                                 
10 There were 3,391 schools that joined the program in 1994 and provided MIS reports in that year.  The 
number of schools appearing in the MIS database without any missing entry between 1994 and 1998 is 
2,764.  The fact that some of the schools ‘dropped out’ of the school-level database in the MIS does not 
mean that those schools dropped out of the program.  No school has reportedly dropped out of the program 
and individual-level recipient data (rather than school-level data) are presumably reported and maintained 
in the MIS database.  The main reason for the attrition of school-level data in MIS appears to be the fact 
that while the individual recipient-data are critical in administering the project school-level data are not 
directly used in administering the project and thus are not as closely monitored as the recipient data.   
11 This data series begins with the 1994 introduction of the FSSAP program.  To see the impact of the 
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Figure 1:  National level gGirls’ class size index among FSSAP schools 
by year (class 6=100) 
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Figure 2:  National level Girl’s class enrollment among FSSAP 
schools by year  
      (Source: FSSAP-MIS dataBangladesh Statistical Yearbook, 1998) 
 
A nationwide picture of the changes in the secondary school enrollment of both 
boys and girls is shown in table 3, and presented in figures 3-5.
12  Figure 3 depicts the 
steady upward trend in enrollment of both boys and girls attending secondary schools.  
The dramatic upward trend in the country’s female secondary school enrollment since the 
early nineties, the period in which school subsidies for girls were first introduced, were  
followed by greatly reduced gender disparity in school enrollment (figure 4).  Since 
 
Figure 3:  National level total secondary enrollment by year  
                                                              (Source: Bangladesh Statistical Yearbook, 1998) 
 
                                                 
12 The data covers both rural and urban area schools, with less than one quarter of the total secondary 
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the FSSAP program operates only in rural areas, overall student enrollment would be 
expected to grow much faster in rural areas as compared with urban areas.  Figure 5 
confirms this notion.
13   
The female share of secondary enrollment was only 17 percent in 1970, 26 
percent in 1980, 33 percent in 1990, and 38 percent in 1994, the initial year of the 
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Figure 4:  National level share of female secondary enrollment by year 
                      (Source: Bangladesh Statistical Yearbook, 1998) 
 
 
increased to 42 percent in 1995 just one year later.  While the average growth in female 
school enrollment was only 8 percent during 1985-90, it increased to 12 percent during 
1991 and 1993, and to 15 percent after 1994.  The rapid rise in rural school enrollments 
beginning with 1992, pictured in figure 5, may reflect, in part, the introduction in 1992-
93 of a government tuition subsidy for girls attending grade six to eight only in rural 
areas. This predecessor to the FSSAP program is likely to have increased the number of 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, information is not available on enrollment by gender in either rural or urban areas.    10
girls “at risk” for continued secondary schooling at the time the FSSAP program was 
being introduced.   
 
This has two ramifications for our econometric analysis.  First, we estimate the 
effect of the FSSAP program above and beyond the effect of the predecessor programs on 
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 Figure 5:  National secondary enrollment in rural and urban area by year (millions) 
                      (Source: Bangladesh Statistical Yearbook, 1998) 
 
  Consequently, the effect we estimate is certainly an underestimate of the full 
effect of school subsidy programs at all levels of schooling on secondary school 
enrollments during the period under study. Second, households may have anticipated the 
broadening of this predecessor program to other grades and kept their daughters in 
school.  Again, this will result in an underestimate of the programs effect since 
enrollments in at the onset of the FSSAP program in 1994 will be larger as a consequence 
of these anticipations.  
  
What is the effect of a girl’s schooling subsidy on boys schooling?  Changes in   11
the price of schooling girl’s arising from the stipend program will affect their schooling 
and that of their brothers through the usual income and substitution effects.  In the 
absence of the stipend, parents, who derive utility from the schooling of both girls and 
boys, will choose the level of schooling for boys and girls given by point X in figure 6.   
 
      Figure 6. The demand for schooling of girls and boys 
 
 
The introduction of a female-only stipend will cause the relative price of girls’ schooling 
to decline, moving the budget constraint out to a point such as Z.  The substitution effect 
is represented by the movement from point X to point Y, and the income effect is the 
movement from Y to Z, which assumes that schooling is a normal good.  Figure 6 
illustrates the case where, with a fixed budget for schooling, a fall in the price of girl’s 
schooling induces a negative cross-price effect on boy’s schooling larger in absolute 
value than the positive income effect on boys schooling. 
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  The subsidy to female secondary school enrollment may also change the sex-
specific school enrollment rate in lower grades.  Girl’s must complete primary school in 
order to gain entrance to secondary school, and hence forward looking parents will take 
into account the relative cost of future schooling in deciding current enrollments of their 
children. 
 
3.  Data and its characteristics 
The household survey data used comes from two recent surveys carried out by the 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) with funding from the World Bank 
(WB).  The BIDS-WB micro-credit project surveyed households and schools in 32 
randomly drawn thanas (sub-districts) throughout Bangladesh (out of 460 thanas 
convered by the FSSAP, FSSP and SEDP programs).   The 1991/92 survey covered 
roughly 1,800 households from 87 villages in 29 thanas, collecting household and 
individual information on labor supply, income, employment, expenditure, borrowing 
and savings.  In conjunction with this survey, a school-level survey was simultaneously 
administered covering the 687 primary, secondary and post-secondary schools attended 
by members of households surveyed.
14  The school-level survey collected information on 
student enrollment by gender and by class and other information such as the number of 
teachers and their gender and qualifications.   
 
                In 1998/99, a follow up survey of the same set of households and schools was 
conducted.  As part of the 1998/99 survey, an additional 180 households were selected 
from 9 villages drawn randomly from three new thanas.  These three thanas were drawn 
from the south-east part of Bangladesh, which was excluded in 1991/92 survey due to the 
damage caused by a devastating cyclone.  The re-survey also added households from the 
original 87 villages, covering a total of 2,599 households and 889 schools.
15    
 
Girl’s school enrollment and grade attainment well exceeded that of boys at the 
end of the 1991-98 period in the BIDS-WB dataset.  As table 4 indicates, 52 percent of 
                                                 
14 There were 301 primary schools and 384 secondary and other non-primary schools in the 1991/92 school 
survey.  
15 Among the 889 schools, there were 476 primary schools and 413 secondary and non-primary schools 
included in the follow-up survey.   13
school-aged (5-18 year old) boys were enrolled in school in 1991, compared to 62 
percent in 1998, implying an annual increase of about 1 percent.  In contrast, 46 percent 
of girls of the same age group attended schools in 1991/92 compared to 65 percent in 
1998/99.  If we focus on the target group of secondary school-aged children (aged 11-18), 
we see more dramatic changes.  For boys of age 11-18 in our sample, the secondary 
school enrollment rate was 47 percent in 1991/92 and 58 percent in 1998/99.  In contrast, 
the corresponding rate for girls of the same cohort was 44 percent in 1991/92 and 60 
percent in 1998/99.  The mean years of schooling completed by girls of age 11-18 
increased from 3.0 years to 4.4, while the mean years of schooling completed by boys of 
the same age group increased from 3.2 to 4.1 over the same period.  Among primary 
school graduates, the transition to secondary school was 45 percent in 1998/99 compared 
to 27 percent in 1991/92 for girls, while the corresponding rates for boys were 40 percent 
in 1998/99 and 27.5 percent in 1991/92.  However, the secondary school completion rate 
has declined for females, while it has increased slightly for males over the same period.  
 
  FSSAP-MIS data contains school-level information on those schools that 
participated in the FSSAP program during the period 1994-1998. Since only female 
students are eligible for the program, the FSSAP-MIS data set includes information on 
participating coeducational or female-only schools.  Exclusion of the male-only schools 
is the major source of discrepancy between our FSSAP-MIS data and the nationwide 
statistics on total and male enrollment.  There are 4,770 schools included in the FSSAP-
MIS data; among them, 3,391 joined the program in 1994, 352 in 1995, 467 in 1996, 303 
in 1997 and 257 in 1998. Among the 4,770 schools, 4,046 (85%) are coeducational and 
724(15%) are female only-schools. While all the participating schools presumably 
reported/maintained student-level information (on attendance and examination marks) for 
all female (but not male) students every year after joining the program —which is 
essential for administering the stipend program— not all schools reported school-level 
information (or school-level data entered in the MIS database) every year.  For example, 
while 3,391 schools reportedly joined the program in 1994, 5 consecutive observations 
during 1994-1998 are found for 3,172 schools. In addition, there are cases where the 
school identification number appears in the data but all the enrollment variables have   14
missing values in some of the data years. As a result, only 2,764 (out of 3,391) schools 
report non-missing enrollment figures for 5 consecutive years. ç
            
4.  Econometric issue in the household level analysis 
The data available for the household-level analysis consists of two household surveys 
conducted in 1991/92 and 1998/99 that sample households from a common set of villages.  
These surveys are the source of our outcome measure, child-specific school enrollment, 
as well as parental characteristics.  These data were merged with school-level data on the 
timing of the introduction of the FSSAP program.  The crucial attributes of the data that 
affect estimation and interpretation are these: 
 
I.  program’s were not in operation in any village during the first round; 
II.  program’s operated in every village during the second round; 
III.  the only source of program variation is the date of its introduction between the 
two rounds. 
 
  Complicating estimation is the possible endogeneity of the date of program 
introduction across the villages of rural Bangladesh.  Fixed effect conditional logit 
models are estimated to sweep out village-level heterogeneity that may both affect the 
determinants of the dependent variable, individual school enrollment, and the timing of 
the introduction of the FSSAP program into villages.   
 
  These data are sufficient to estimate the marginal effects of FSSAP program on 
the school enrollments of children, however, they are insufficient to identify the average 
effects of the program.  To demonstrate the nature of our data and its limitations in the 
simplest manner, consider an illustrative model with first round outcome yi1 
 
     yi1 = α1 + εi1               (1) 
 
where α1 is an intercept and εi1 is an error associated with outcomes in round 1, and a 
second round outcome yi2 
   15
     yi2 = α2 + δpi2 + εi2            (2) 
 
where pi2 is the intensity of an intervention in the second round.  Observations are 
indexed by only i and time t=1, 2 as we abstract from “villages” or other clustering of the 
data, as well as issues of endogeneity and fixed effects.  The intervention did not operate 
at the time of round 1, so that pi1 = 0 for all i  = 1 , . . , N, in the second round pi2 > 0 for 
all i.  The difference (α2 – α1) represents the change in outcome y due solely to the 
passage of time.
16  It is clear that if the program intensity were the same for all sample 
points in round 2 (pi2 = 1 for all i = 1 , . . , N) then it would be impossible to identify α2 
from the program effect δ.  Having pi2 vary is sufficient to identify δ.  However, the time 
effect (α2 – α1) is not separately identified from any scalar translation of the measure of 
program intensity p2i, and consequently the average effect of the treatment is not 
identifiable unless such scalar translation is ruled out.  In our case, pi2 is number of years 
of program operation.  It could have alternatively been coded as the calendar year that the 
program began operation, which is a scalar translation of the form  2
~
i p  = pi2 + ω.  In this 
case, equation (2) becomes 
 
         yi2 = α2 + δ 2
~
i p  + εi2 = (α2 + δω) + δpi2 + εi2 =  2
~ α  + δ 2 i p  + εi2                  (3) 
 
This scalar translation has no effect on α1 because pi1 = 0.  Consequently, the time effect 
( 2
~ α  – α1) is not invariant to a scalar translation of how program intensity p is measured. 
 
  Figure 7 illustrates this issue graphically.  At time t=τ, τ<0, prior to the 
introduction of the program, the (average) outcome is α1.  The program is introduced at 
time t=0 with instantaneous treatment effect δω, where ω can be positive or negative.   
For simplicity, assume that the effect of the treatment increases by δ for each year up to 
some maximum number of years T.  The average outcome in year 0 without treatment is 
α2 and with treatment is α2 + δω.  When ω=1 we have a model in which the treatment is  
                                                 
16 The tuition subsidy program for girls enrolled in grade 6-8 in operation during 1992-93 also effects 
secondary school enrollments during the 1994 to 1998 period.  Its effect is not separately identified from 
the time effect (α2 – α1).   16
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      Figure 6. Identification of program effects 
 
linear in treatment intensity (time) and the total (average) treatment effect is identifiable. 
Lacking data on treatment at time 0, it is not possible to separate out α2 from δω without 
knowing ω.  However, one can identify δ, the effect of a marginal year (intensity) of 
treatment, from data on program durations (intensities) and outcomes in years 1,2,…T. 
This is the parameter that we estimate below. 
 
  Now consider a model having a single exogenous regressor xit, and in which the 
program affects behavior through an interaction with a regressor xit.  In this, case 
equation (1) becomes 
 
    yi1 = α1 + βxi1 + εi1               (4) 
   17
and equation (2) becomes 
 
   yi2 = α2 + δpi2 + δxpi2xi2 + βxi2 + εi2                           (5) 
 
so that a scalar translation of the program measure to  2
~
i p  = pi2 + ω as before yields 
 
yi2 = α2 +  2
~
i p δ  +  2
~
i xp δ xi2 + βxi2 + εi2 = (α2 + δω) + δpi2 + δxpi2xi2 + (β + δxω)xi2 + εi2    (6) 
 
In the equation above, the parameter on xi2 in the second equation (β + δxω) differs from 
the parameter on xi1 by the factor δxω.  In order to correctly estimate these equations 
jointly, or to estimate the time-differenced equation, requires that a variable interacting 
round (time) with xi2 be added as an independent variable; otherwise the estimates are not 
invariant to scalar translation.  This variable will capture the effect of δxω arising from 
scale translation when β is truly time invariant. 
 
  The particular empirical model formulated is 
 
sijt = αt + δ(kijt ,pjt) + γ1kijt + 
2
2 ijt k γ  + Xijtβ + µj + εijt;   t = 1, 2          (7) 
 
where sijt is the latent school enrollment of child i in village j in year t, kijt is the age of 
this child,  α, γ1, and γ2 are parameters, δ is a function of child age and pjt, the duration of 
the program in village j in year t, Xijt is a vector of exogenous attributes affecting school-
going behavior with associated parameter vector β, µj is a village-specific error, and εijt is 
a nonsystematic error.  The function δ(kijt ,pjt) captures the possibly nonlinear effect of 
program duration and its interaction with child age.  Unfortunately, pj2 takes only three 
values representing the three different starting dates of the FSSAP program.  This 
provides us with very few degrees of freedom to work with when specifying  δ(kijt ,pjt) 
without destroying parameter identification.  For this reason, we restrict ourselves to 
single parameter forms, in particular δ(kijt ,pjt) = δpjt  and δ(kijt ,pjt) = δpjtkijt. Note that age 
and its square are always separately included.   18
 
  The interaction of age and program effects and more general forms of δ(kijt ,pjt) 
allow the effect of program duration on school enrollment to depend on age or, 
equivalently, on the duration of exposure to the program and the age at which that 
exposure began.  Age at first exposure to the program is simply fijt = kijt - pjt.  If first 
exposure occurs when the child is older, he or she may already have left school.  The 
younger the child when first exposed, the greater the effect on subsequent school 
behavior as the subsidy should, in principle, reduce the probability of leaving school (or 
not entering) at every age above the minimal age of initial primary school entrance.  On 
the other hand, the discounted value of the stipend to younger students who would at 
most be in primary school is smaller the further they are away from the entry into 
secondary school.  If there is non-independence in household decision-making within the 
village, then observing one’s neighbors start to send their daughters to attend secondary 
school in previous years may affect parent’s decision on the schooling of their daughters 
in the current year.  Consequently, the effect of the program can continue to grow well 
beyond its date of introduction. 
 
5. Results of the household-level analysis 
Summary statistics of the independent variables is shown in table 5 and the results of the 
household-level analysis are presented in table 6.  The dependent variable in every case is 
current school enrollment.  The sample is broken between boys and girls of ages 11 to 18 
years and 13 to 18 years, the ages at which students are at risk for school leaving.  The 
program duration variable reflects the date at which any school serving the children of a 
village became associated with FSSAP, and is coded as the years since introduction 
(1994=5, 1995=4, and 1996=3). 
 
  The first two columns of table 6 present standard logit estimates of the 
determinants of current school enrollment.  The duration of the FSSAP stipend program 
in the village does not have a statistically significant effect on school enrollment for 
either gender when village-level heterogeneity is not controlled for.  The columns marked 
“Model 1" present the same specification using village fixed effects logit.  The estimated   19
coefficient on stipend duration for girls is positive (0.557) and statistically significant 
(t=2.36) using village fixed effects.  This parameter corresponds to a derivative of the 
probability of school enrollment with respect to a year of stipend duration of 
approximately 0.12.  The effects on boys schooling remain statistically zero. 
 
  As argued above, the effect of the secondary school stipends on school enrollment 
may depend on child age.  One reason is that the value of the stipend to younger students 
who would still be in primary school is smaller the further they are away from the 
possible entry into secondary school.  Moreover, school enrollment rates are quite high 
(about 80 percent for both girls and boys) at these ages.  In model 2, where we drop 
children of 11 and 12 years of age from the sample, the estimated effect of stipend 
duration on girls rises appreciably (from 0.557 to 0.808) and the coefficient has a t-ratio 
of 2.77.  With the limited variation on stipend duration available in these data, we allow 
for age-varying stipend effects through an age-stipend interaction term without a level 
stipend variable.  The results of this specification are labeled Model 3 in Table 6. As 
suggested, the age-stipend interaction is positive and significant for girls.  
 
6. Stipend program impact: analysis with FSSAP MIS data 
Although the analysis of the household survey data demonstrates a positive effect of the 
female stipend program on girls’ secondary enrollment, parameter identification rests on 
the limited variation in program duration across the villages in our sample.  Our results 
would be strengthened if we could get confirmatory results from an analysis based on a 
very different data set.  In particular, we make use of the aggregate school-level 
information obtained from the MIS information of the FSSAP project for this 
confirmation.   The schools covered in the FSSAP MIS data provide information annually 
for the years 1994 to 1998, but not prior to 1994.   The basic source of identification is 
the same — not all schools were enrolled in the FSSAP stipend program at the same time.  
However, the annual MIS data allow us to make use of another source of variation — not 
all grades were treated at the same year, even if the school was treated.  We exploited 
both sources of variation observed at the school level to estimate the stipend program   20
effect.  The student cohorts observed in FSSAP-MIS data are summarized in box 1. Each 
cohort in the box is represented by a unique shade or pattern.  
 
Box 1. The student class cohorts* observed in the FSSAP-MIS data 
Year  Class 6  Class 7  Class 8  Class 9  Class 10 
1994  1994 cohort  1993 cohort 1992 cohort 1991 cohort  1990 cohort
1995  1995 cohort  1994 cohort 1993 cohort 1992 cohort  1991 cohort
1996  1996 cohort  1995 cohort 1994 cohort 1993 cohort  1992 cohort
1997  1997 cohort  1996 cohort 1995 cohort 1994 cohort  1993 cohort
1998  1998 cohort  1997 cohort 1996 cohort 1995 cohort  1994 cohort
*A ‘class cohort’ is defined as a group of students entering secondary school in a particular year, with each 
class cohort being identified by the year of entering class 6 (entering class cohort of 1991, 1992, etc.)    
box is represented by a unique shade or pattern.  
 
The FSSAP-MIS data contain enrollment data for each class for the year 
between 1994 (for schools that joined the program after 1994, the first year they joined 
the program) and 1998 so that MIS data constitute a school-level panel data set on 
enrollment immediately following the introduction of the stipend program.  A major 
limitation of the FSSAP-MIS data, however, is that they contain no information on the 
period before the program was introduced.  Nevertheless, there is one source of variation 
among class cohorts that helps us identify the program impact;  Tthat is, the stipend 
program restricted the entry points for the stipend recipients to only class 6 and class 9.  
This feature is applies to all three stipend programs.  That is, when the nationwide stipend 
program started in 1994, stipend was awarded to the female students in classes 6 and 9 
alone.  In 1995, stipend was awarded to the female students in all the classes except class 
8.  Starting in 1996, all the female students meeting the eligibility criteria received 
stipend 
 
Box 2. The student class cohorts* included in the FSSAP-MIS data and stipend 
recipients 
Year  Class 6  Class 7  Class 8  Class 9  Class 10 
1994  1994 cohort  1993 cohort  1992 cohort  1991 cohort  1990 cohort 
1995  1995 cohort  1994 cohort  1993 cohort  1992 cohort  1991 cohort 
1996  1996 cohort  1995 cohort  1994 cohort  1993 cohort  1992 cohort 
1997  1997 cohort  1996 cohort  1995 cohort  1994 cohort  1993 cohort 
1998  1998 cohort  1997 cohort  1996 cohort  1995 cohort  1994 cohort 
*A ‘class cohort’ is defined as a group of students entering secondary school in a particular year, with each 
class cohort being identified by the year of entering class 6 (entering class cohort of 1990, 1991, 1992, etc.)  
The shaded areas in the figure indicate the class cohort eligible for the stipend in a given year.      21
 
regardless of the class cohort (the class cohorts of female students receiving stipend in 
different years—indicated by the shaded area— are summarized in box 2). 
 
Thus the coexistence of class cohorts receiving and not receiving the stipend in 
the same school in the same year provide intra-school variation in program exposure, a 
source of variation which is not available in the two cross-sections of household survey 
data analyzed above. Although all class cohorts become eligible for stipend during the 
time frame of these MIS data, relatively few cohorts did not receive stipends once the 
program was introduced into their school (unshaded in Box 2).  We also calculate the 
future program duration, which is equal to the number of additional years that a girl in a 
particular class would get the stipend if she continues her education.  To estimate the 
effect of the female stipend program on boy’s enrollment in FSSAP schools, we calculate 
the mean of actual and future program durations across all classes.  
 
We used the FSSAP-MIS school-level data to estimate the net impact of the 
stipend program on grade-specific enrollment.  As we observed in section 2 above, 
national level data on enrollment indicate that there had been an upward trend in the 
enrollment before the stipend started.  Thus it is likely that, even without the stipend 
program, the enrollment would have kept increasing after 1994.  In order to estimate the 
net stipend impact controlling for the trend increase in demand for education as well as 
for other factors, we have fitted a semi-logarithmic grade-specific school enrollment 
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where hijt is a set of class/school/village level variables, the sijt is the number of years of  
exposure to the stipend program for female students in class i, in school j, and year t, fijt is 
future duration of stipend for female students in class i, in school j, and year t conditional   22
on remaining in secondary school until completion. The schooling variables (Gijt and Bijt ) 
are measures of log grade-specific enrollment levels of  i-th class in the j-th school in 
period t so that the coefficient of stipend duration measures the percentage change in the 
level of grade-specific enrollment with respect to one year of program duration.  The 
error is composed of a time-invariant school-specific component µ j and a nonsystematic 
component.  Unobserved attributes of a school, µ j, may determine the timing of its 
program stipend treatment, and consequently bias least squares estimates of these 
equation.  School-level fixed effects differences out the this error component, as well as 
any school and location observed and unobserved time-invariant variables that influence 
school enrollment behavior.
17   
  
Our empirical results using FSSAP-MIS school-level data are summarized in 
table 7.  Our results show that the duration of stipend program has a significant positive 
impact on female class enrollment and a significant negative effect on male class 
enrollment in FSSAP schools.  On average, one additional year of program exposure 
increases the female class enrollment rate by 8 percent, and reduces the male class 
enrollment rate by 29 percent.   An additional year of future program exposure until 
graduation increases girls’ secondary level class enrollment by 3.4 percent.  Since almost 
all girl’s schools became FSSAP schools between 1994 and 1996, and transportation 
costs are high, there is likely to have been relatively little transfer of girls from non-
FSSAP schools to FSSAP schools.  However, boys had many more schooling choice 
since they could readily enroll in male only schools, none of which are captured in these 
data.  The results for boys simply suggest that the sex composition of coeducational 
schools was strongly effected by this sex-specific subsidy program. 
 
  The enrollment equations at the school level are re-run with quadratic program 
duration to see whether program impacts are non-linear (also shown in table 7).  We find 
that the program effect is non-linear for both boys and girls. The positive effect for girls’ 
                                                 
17 Random effects models are also estimated.  However, the Hausman tests strongly rejected the null 
hypothesis that the unobserved school-level effects are uncorrelated with the regressors.  Thus, we only 
report the fixed-effects results here.     23
class enrollment increases with additional years, while the negative effect for boys’ is 
reduced (or algebraically increases) with additional years. 
 
These school-level estimates of girl’s enrollment suffer from a number of 
drawbacks.  First and foremost, the unit of analysis is the school rather than the true 
decision-making unit, the household.  There are very few secondary schools in rural areas 
and the transport and other cost of moving schools in response to the FSSAP program are 
so large as to make it doubtful that secondary school transfers drive the results for girls in 
any appreciable way, as noted above. Nevertheless, schools may be expanding beyond 
the trend effect in response to the FSSAP program, and, to the extent that school 
enrollment decisions were constrained by school capacity, this is included as a program 
effect.  Arguably, it should be included as a consequence of program introduction. 
Second, as new secondary schools are opening during this period, rather than closing, we 
may be underestimating program effects. Only schools in operation in 1994 are included 
in the panel.  Third, we abstract from pretreatment “announcement” effects.  Households 
may have known about the stipend program prior to its actual introduction and kept girls 
in primary school and secondary school as a consequence.  This anticipatory behavior 
occurring prior to program introduction may not be very different from behavior 
subsequent to program introduction in which households are also likely to consider the 
secondary school stipend in deciding on the primary schooling of girls. Although both 
data sets used in the analysis of the FSSAP have their deficiencies, they both strongly 
suggest that this program has clearly benefited girls’ school enrollment, perhaps at the 
cost of boys.    
 
7.  Targeting students with stipend: Who actually benefit the most among girls?  
The female stipend program designed and implemented in Bangladesh is targeted to rural 
areas and only to girls who satisfy the stated criteria. The eligibility criteria of securing 
45 percent of marks, attending 75 percent of school days, and staying unmarried, may not 
be strictly enforced.  According to FSSAP-MIS data, only 6 percent of secondary 
students have failed to obtain a stipend because they did not satisfy the criteria (World 
Bank 1997).  While the program has enhanced girls’ secondary schooling, cost data 
shows unequivocally that the program is expensive to operate.   In particular, the stipend   24
part is costlier than the tuition subsidy part of the program.  Also the administrative costs 
of the female stipend program, as reported in the FSSAP annual reports, accounts for 
more than 18 percent of the total cost of the program.  Schooling is subsidized in 
Bangladesh even without the stipend program.  With the stipend program in place, the 
educational subsidy is more than doubled at the secondary education level.   Sustaining 
such a program may not be feasible for the government, in which case targeting may be 
worth considering.
18   
 
In order to consider the distributional effects of the stipend program on children 
by land ownership status, the school enrollment equation is re-estimated adding as an 
independent variable our measure of landholding (the log of landholdings in hundredths 
of an acre plus one) interacted with the stipend program duration variable.  The results 
presented in table 8 clearly suggest that the school enrollment benefits of the FSSAP 
program accrue disproportionately to girls from households with larger quantities of 
owned land. There is no effect on boy’s school enrollment of stipend duration or its 
interaction with land.  Land ownership has been used as an effective targeting mechanism 
for microfinance programs such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and its application 
in the FSSAP program may be an effective way of redirecting the subsidy to poorer 
households.   
 
8.  Summary and policy conclusions  
An analysis using both household- and school-level data indicate that the nationwide 
rural stipend program for girls has had a significant positive impact on the secondary 
school enrollment of school age girls, and reduced boys’ enrollment in coeducational 
secondary schools in rural Bangladesh.  The school level data shows that, on average, an 
additional year of stipend program duration increased the female student secondary 
enrollment of an incoming cohort by as much as 8 percent.  The household-level data 
analysis suggest that an additional year of program duration increases the school 
                                                 
18 In fact, the mid-term review World Bank mission of the FSSAP project recommended such a targeting 
criteria.  The mission recommended that the FSSAP project may have a pilot area where they introduce 
stipend and tuition subsidy targeting on the following: students would receive the stipend package if (i) 
parents do not own  land; (ii) the girl has only one parent/guardian; (iii) mothers did not complete primary 
education; and (iv) none of the older siblings had ever attended a secondary school.      25
enrollment rate of girl’s aged 11-18 years by 12 percentage points, and has no discernable 
effect on boy’s enrollment.   
   
  As the program is costly and requires donor support to sustain this program, a 
natural question arises if the program can be targeted and if so how.  One possibility is to 
target the program by landholding class.  Our findings indicate that the currently 
untargeted stipend disproportionately effects the school enrollment of girls from 
households with larger land wealth.  Targeting towards the land poor may reduce the 
overall enrollment gains of the program while equalizing enrollment effects across 
landholding classes. 
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Table 1. Stipend and tuition rates (amount in Taka) 
First installment: Jan-Jun  Second installation: Jul-Dec  Class    School 







Govt. 150  60    210  150  60    210 420  25  10  6 
Non- 
Govt. 
150 90   240  150  90   240  480 25 15 
Govt. 180  72    252  180  72    252 504  30  12  7 
Non- 
Govt. 
180 90   270  180  90   270  540 30 15 
Govt. 210  72    282  210  72    282 564  35  12  8 
Non- 
Govt. 
210 90   300  210  90   300  600 35 15 
Govt. 360  90  250 700  360  90    450  1150  60  15  9 
Non- 
Govt. 
360  120  250  730  360 120   480  1210  60 20 
Govt.  360 90    450  540 135 250  925  1375  60 15  10 
Non- 
Govt. 
360  120   480  540 180 250  970  1450  60 20 





Table 2. Secondary school enrollment among FSSAP schools 
  Class 6  Class 7  Class 8 Class 9 Class 10 Class 6 Class 7  Class 8  Class 9 Class 10
Year Male  Female 
A. Actual enrollment 
1994  128,030   102,852   89,025  76,225  69,499  124,199  87,280   74,243  55,981  44,685 
1995  136,171   114,466   97,846  84,045  64,353  119,925  116,318   82,842  61,770  50,419 
1996  136,034   121,821   101,793  84,788  80,334  123,719  112,314   105,879  65,026  62,466 
1997  139,265   115,514   104,550  90,386  73,700  132,247  115,690   104,062  101,865  60,341 
1998  140,737   117,405   98,601  91,254  74,315  152,348  128,525   108,590  104,407  90,250 
B. Indexed enrollment (class 6=100)
1994  100  80 70 60  54  100  70 60 45  36 
1995  100  84 72 62  47  100  97 69 52  42 
1996  100  90 75 62  59  100  91 86 53  50 
1997  100  83 75 65  53  100  87 79 77  46 
1998  100  83 70 65  53  100  84 71 69  59 
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Table 3. Nationwide secondary enrollment (thousands) and its growth rate (percentage) 





















1961  367  -- 166 -- 533 --  31.14  n/a  n/a 
1970  1205  14.12* 255  4.89* 1460  11.85*  17.47 n/a n/a 
1980 1778 3.97*  627  9.41*  2405  5.12* 26.07  n/a  n/a 
1985 1866 0.97*  772  4.25*  2638  1.87* 29.26  n/a  n/a 
1986 1941  4.02  804  4.15  2745  4.06  29.29  n/a  n/a 
1987  2053  5.77  909 13.06  2962 7.91  30.69 n/a  n/a 
1988 2130  3.75  1014  11.55  3144  6.14  32.25 2192  952 
1989 2293  7.65  1124  10.85  3417  8.68  32.89 2426  991 
1990  2345  2.27 1180 4.98 3525 3.16  33.48  2506  1021 
1991  2297 -2.05  1365 15.68 3662  3.89 37.27 2586 1076 
1992  2480 7.97  1529 12.01 4009  9.48 38.14 2772 1237 
1993 3017 21.65  1656  8.31  4673  16.56 35.44 3381  1293 
1994  3008 -0.30  1876 13.29 4884  4.52 38.41 3485 1399 
1995  3204 6.52  2327 24.04 5531 13.25  42.07  3970 1561 
1996  3277  2.28 2511 7.91 5788 4.65  43.38  4182  1606 
1997  3239  -1.16 2718 8.24 5957 2.92  45.63  4325  1632 
 *: annual average    
 Source: Statistical Yearbook 1998 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of outcome variables from household survey data  
1991/92 1998/99  Dependent variables 
Mean  No. of obs.  Mean  No. of obs. 




























































Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Source: BIDS-World Bank household surveys, 1991/92 and 1998/99   28
                         Table 5: Summary statistics of independent variables from  
household survey data 
Independent variables  Mean  
Stipend duration (years)  2.658 
(2.193) 
Age (years)  14.174 
(2.268) 
Gender (boy=1, girl=0)  0.554 
(0.497) 
Education of household head (years)  3.514 
(3.931) 
Gender of household head (Male=1, Female=0)  0.930 
(0.256) 
Age of household head (years)  48.209 
(11.317) 
Household land assets (decimals)  174.061 
(414.466) 
If village has electricity  0.657 
(0.475) 
Percentage of village land that is irrigated  0.469 
(0.353) 
If village is accessed by road  0.788 
(0.409) 
Village daily adult male wage (taka)  38.807 
(18.161) 
Village daily adult female wage (taka)  21.748 
(12.319) 
Number of observations  2,446 
  Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
                      Source: BIDS-World Bank household surveys, 1991/92 and 1998/99 
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Table 6: Impacts of stipend program duration on current enrollment rate  
  Logit  Village FE Logit: 
Model 1 
Village FE Logit: 
Model 2 
Village FE Logit:  
Model 3 
  Age 11-18  Age 11-18  Age 13-18  Age 11-18 
  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls
Stipend  duration  (years)  -0.055 0.056 0.139 0.557 0.152 0.808 
  (-0.52) (0.44) (0.80) (2.36) (0.75) (2.77) 
- - 




































Education  of  household  head  (years) 0.137  0.165 0.124 0.172 0.134 0.183 0.124  0.172
  (7.91)  (7.97) (6.60) (6.97) (6.51) (6.56) (6.63)  (6.97)
Gender of household head (1=male,  

















Age of household head (years)  -0.001  0.004  -0.002  0.002  0.004  0.002  -0.002  0.002
  (-0.18)  (0.73) (-0.35) (0.28) (0.65) (0.28) (-0.33)  (0.26)
Log of household land-holdings 
(decimals) 
0.242  0.115 0.269 0.202 0.238 0.252 0.270  0.203
  (6.58)  (2.67) (6.54) (3.98) (4.99) (4.22) (6.55)  (3.99)
If  village  has  electricity  -0.554  -0.866 -0.633 -1.198 -0.240 -0.603 -0.646  -1.188
  (-3.95)  (-5.01) (-3.87) (-5.49) (-1.28) (-2.28) (-3.96)  (-5.42)
0.487  1.002 0.735 1.216 0.804 0.892 0.718  1.199 If village is accessed by road whole 
year  (2.14)  (3.67) (2.61) (3.40) (2.42) (2.17) (2.54)  (3.35)
Log of village male wage (taka)  0.062  0.231  -0.016  0.183  -0.141  0.189  -0.015  0.193
  (0.68)  (2.18) (-0.16) (1.32) (-1.12) (1.12) (-0.15)  (1.39)
0.270  0.109 0.293 0.164 0.359 0.273 0.292  0.165 Log of village female wage (taka) 
(2.88)  (1.07) (2.58) (1.19) (2.67) (1.59) (2.58)  (1.19)
Log likelihood   -1011.23  -732.99 -806.37 -497.77 -572.94  -330.10  -805.51 -497.32
Number  of  observations  1,967  1,682 1,967 1,677 1,386 1,180 1,967  1,677
   Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
   Source: BIDS-World Bank household surveys, 1991/92 and 1998/99 
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Table 7. School-level fixed-effects impacts of stipend duration on 
grade-specific enrollment (class six to ten) 
Model 1  Model 2 
Independent variables 
Female Male Female Male 
Stipend duration (years)  0.083  -0.289  0.029  -0.390 
   (44.249) (-10.035) (6.492)  (-10.882) 
Expected future stipend duration (years)  0.034    0.032   
 (4.278)    (2.554)   
Stipend duration squared        0.012  0.089 
         (13.420)  (4.722) 
Expected future stipend duration squared      0.006   
     (5.371)   
Adjusted R-squared   0.084  0.067  0.084  0.096 





Total number of  observations  89,861  79,559  89,861  79,559 
       Note: In addition above variables, the regressions include these explanatory variables: year  
                              and its square, class and its square, whether the school has tube well, drinking water,  
                              and latrine. 
                   Source: FSSAP-MIS data     31
Table 8: Impacts of stipend duration and its interactions with household  
landholding on current enrollment rate (Village FE Logit) 
Independent variables  Boys  Girls 
Stipend duration (years)  0.138  0.297 
 (0.73)  (1.17) 
Stipend duration * log of household landholdings (decimal)  0.0003  0.055 
 (0.02)  (2.71) 
Age   -1.522  -0.096 
 (-4.01)  (-0.20) 
Age squared  0.037  -0.016 
 (2.88)  (-1.00) 
Education of household head (years)  0.124  0.171 
 (6.60)  (6.90) 




Age of household head (years)  -0.002  0.002 
 (-0.35)  (0.26) 
Log of household land-holdings (decimals)  0.268  0.066 
 (4.58)  (0.93) 
If village has electricity  -0.633  -1.210 
 (-3.87)  (-5.52) 
If village is accessed by road whole year  0.735  1.207 
 (2.61)  (3.36) 
Log of village male wage (taka)  -0.016  0.200 
 (-0.16)  (1.44) 
Log of village female wage (taka)  0.292  0.156 
 (2.52)  (1.13) 
Log likelihood  -806.365  -494.08 
Number of observations  1,967  1,677 
    Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
    Source: BIDS-World Bank Household Survey data, 1991/92 and 1998/99. 
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